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Autism spectrum disorders have been proposed to arise from impairments in the probabilis-
tic integration of prior knowledge with sensory inputs. Circular inference is one such possible
impairment, in which excitation-to-inhibition imbalances in the cerebral cortex cause the
reverberation and amplification of prior beliefs and sensory information. Recent empirical
work has associated circular inference with the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia. Inhibi-
tion impairments have also been observed in autism, suggesting that signal reverberation
might be present in that condition as well. In this study, we collected data from 21 partici-
pants with self-reported diagnoses of autism spectrum disorders and 155 participants with a
broad range of autistic traits in an online probabilistic decision-making task (the fisher task).
We used previously established Bayesian models to investigate possible associations
between autistic traits or autism and circular inference. There was no correlation between
prior or likelihood reverberation and autistic traits across the whole sample. Similarly, no dif-
ferences in any of the circular inference model parameters were found between autistic par-
ticipants and those with no diagnosis. Furthermore, participants incorporated information
from both priors and likelihoods in their decisions, with no relationship between their weights
and psychiatric traits, contrary to what common theories for both autism and schizophrenia
would suggest. These findings suggest that there is no increased signal reverberation in
autism, despite the known presence of excitation-to-inhibition imbalances. They can be
used to further contrast and refine the Bayesian theories of schizophrenia and autism,
revealing a divergence in the computational mechanisms underlying the two conditions.
Author summary
Perception results from the combination of our sensory inputs with our brain’s previous
knowledge of the environment. This is usually described as a process of Bayesian inference
or predictive coding and is thought to underly a multitude of cognitive modalities. Impair-
ments in this process are thought to explain various psychiatric disorders, in particular
autism and schizophrenia, for which similar Bayesian theories have been proposed despite
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differences in their symptoms. Recently, a new model of Bayesian impairment in schizo-
phrenia was proposed and validated using behavioural experiments, called the ‘circular
inference’ model. In the current study, we used the same task and computational model-
ling to explore whether circular inference could also account for autism spectrum disor-
ders. We find that participants with autistic traits or self-reported diagnoses of autism do
not present increased levels of circularity. This is the first study to investigate circular
inference in autism, and one of the very few to explore possible autism and schizophrenia
impairments with the same task and identical analytical methods. Our findings indicate
one potential way in which the explanations of the two conditions might differ.
Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and schizophrenia (SCZ) are two heterogeneous mental dis-
orders with a complicated relationship [1,2]. While the term ‘autism’ was initially used to refer
to one of schizophrenia’s symptoms [3], the two disorders have since been considered as sepa-
rate conditions and have been studied as such by most researchers. Despite that, numerous
links have been observed between them, from behavioural and neurophysiological similarities
in social cognition impairments [4,5], to immune [6] or intestinal [7] dysregulation and
genetic overlap [8], among others. Such findings suggest that the relationship between schizo-
phrenia and ASD should be more thoroughly explored, within a framework that is able to han-
dle and explain their differences [9,10].
In Bayesian theories of perception and cognition, the brain is viewed as constantly making
probabilistic calculations in order to infer the true state of the environment. The information
coming from sensory inputs is captured by the likelihood function and is combined with prior
beliefs about the environment, in a process akin to Bayesian inference [11]. This framework
has been widely adopted in both ASD and SCZ research, with a frequently proposed hypothe-
sis for both disorders being that sensory inputs are overweighted relative to prior beliefs [12–
16] (see [17–19] for an alternative SCZ hypothesis). In schizophrenia, this theory attempts to
explain the tendency of patients to jump to conclusions [20] and their partial immunity to per-
ceptual illusions [21], with hallucinations and delusions being interpreted as the formation of
bizarre beliefs to account for strange, hypersalient sensory data [22]. Intriguingly, the hypothe-
sis of overweighted sensory information is also suggested to account for most of ASD’s symp-
toms, such as sociocognitive impairments, attention to detail, sensory hypersensitivity, and
decreased susceptibility to illusions [15]. The similarity of the proposed theories for autism
and schizophrenia is surprising given their distinct symptomatology. However, very few
Bayesian studies have examined both conditions using the same experimental or computa-
tional paradigm, which would be crucial for understanding their relationship and mechanisms
of action.
In 2013, Jardri and Denève proposed a new computational explanation for schizophrenia,
called Circular Inference [23], motivated by an attempt to understand the potential conse-
quences of the increased excitation-to-inhibition (E/I) ratio that is associated with the condi-
tion [24,25]. Using hierarchical network simulations, they showed that inhibitory impairments
in the cortex might lead to sensory evidence or prior beliefs being reverberated throughout the
network that the brain uses to represent the environment, overwhelming the inferential pro-
cess. Sensory input reverberation could cause the reported ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias in
schizophrenia, where patients get overconfident in their beliefs based on relatively little evi-
dence [26]. The positive symptoms, then, can be seen as an extension of the same process,
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where hallucinations and delusions are produced by misplaced certainty in noisy perceptual
and other non-sensory information, respectively.
Jardri et al. supported this hypothesis with behavioural evidence from 25 SCZ patients and
25 controls [27], using a probabilistic variant of the beads task [28], called the fisher task. In the
fisher task, subjects are asked to estimate the chance that a red fish caught by a fisherman came
from one of two lakes, while being presented with the lake preferences of the fisherman and
the proportions of red fish in each lake (Fig 1). The researchers interpreted the preferences
(which were presented first) as a Bayesian prior and the fish proportions as the sensory evi-
dence. They showed that all participants exhibited signs of signal reverberation. Importantly,
they found that sensory evidence was reverberated more in patients, with the magnitude of
reverberation being correlated with their positive symptoms. A following study confirmed
these findings, utilising a social version of the beads task in a sample of 35 patients with schizo-
phrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 40 controls [29]. The researchers found that the circu-
lar inference model fitted best the participants’ behaviour, with increased sensory
reverberation in patients. They also presented strong evidence for an association between that
reverberation and various clinical features in patients (e.g., delusions, anhedonia-asociality).
Impaired inhibition has been strongly associated with autism [30–34]. A question that
arises naturally is, therefore, whether circular inferences are present in ASD, and whether they
would then be of the same nature as in schizophrenia (e.g., sensory vs prior reverberation). In
the present study, we aimed to assess cue integration across a sample with a broad range of
autistic traits, which also included some autistic participants (‘autistic’ is the preferred term by
people on the autism spectrum [35]). This allowed us to investigate signal reverberation within
a dimensional as well as a more traditional, categorical view of autism [36–39]. To achieve
that, we utilised an online version of the fisher task, and both circular inference and more tra-
ditional Bayesian models. This provided us with an opportunity to explore the influences of
Fig 1. An outline of the four stages of the fisher task. 1) The fixation cross is presented; 2) participants are shown the
preference of the fisherman, visualised as two baskets of varying sizes, one for each lake; 3) a blank screen is presented; 4)
participants are shown the fish proportions and are asked to make a confidence estimate about the lake of origin of the
fish (Adapted from Jardri et al., 2017 [27]).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.g001
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ASD in probabilistic decision-making, while also allowing an additional, qualitative compari-
son with past SCZ findings.
Methods and materials
Ethics statement
The present study was approved by the University of Edinburgh, School of Informatics Ethics
committee (RT number 29368).
Sample
We recruited 204 naive adults; 61 voluntarily via our social media networks and 143 with fixed
monetary compensation via the Prolific recruiting platform [40]. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and were not taking any psychotropic medication. 28 subjects
were excluded for providing low quality data (Section A3 in S1 Supplementary Information).
The final sample included 102 male and 71 female participants, with a median age of 26.6
years. The study was conducted online. Participants were presented with detailed information
about the study and had to click a button to indicate consent for the experiment to start.
Half of the Prolific subsample was selected to have a self-reported diagnosis of ASD or to
identify as part of the autism spectrum (Section A1 in S1 Supplementary Information), with 21
subjects having a diagnosis in the final sample. All participants filled in the Autism Spectrum
Quotient (AQ) questionnaire [41] and the 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI)
[42]. The final sample showed indeed stronger autistic traits (mean 22.9, SD 6.5) than what is
usually found in the general population (mean 16.9, SD 5.6) [43], but no difference in
delusional ideation (mean 6.1, SD 3.1 vs mean 6.7, SD 4.4) [42]. Interestingly, the participants
with the ASD diagnoses had AQ scores on the low-end (mean 28.0, SD 8.0) compared to those
reported in the literature for autistic individuals (mean 35.2, SD 6.3) [43]. Statistical power for
our tests could not be calculated, as model parameters were not verifiably following any
known distribution. However, the strength of Jardri et al.’s findings [27] suggests that compa-
rable effects would reach statistical significance in our larger sample, according to an explor-
atory analysis (Section A4 in S1 Supplementary Information).
Procedure
The task was kept as similar to the original fisher task [27] as possible. The participants were
shown a fisherman having caught a red fish and were asked which of two lakes the fish was
caught from. To make this decision, they were presented with two kinds of information in
each trial: 1) the preferences of the fisherman for each of the lakes, visualised as two baskets of
varying sizes (prior); 2) the proportions of red versus black fish in each lake, visualised as 100
fish in two lake drawings (sensory evidence or likelihood). Subjects were instructed to gauge
their confidence and respond using a continuous semi-circular scale, ranging from ‘I’m sure
LEFT LAKE’ to ‘I’m sure RIGHT LAKE’, with ‘I don’t know’ in the middle. Confidence esti-
mates were interpreted probabilistically, in a continuous manner, with a click on the left edge
of the scale corresponding to a probability of 1 for the fish originating in the left lake (0 for the
right) and vice versa.
Trials were structured as follows (Fig 1): Initially, a fixation cross was shown for 800ms, fol-
lowed by the two baskets for 1000ms, and a blank screen lasting 50ms. Then, the lake drawings,
the fisherman with the red fish, and the scale appeared on the screen until the subject gave a
response. Participants were presented with detailed instructions which they could view many
times before proceeding to the task. The instructions made clear that participants should
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY No increased circular inference in high autistic traits or autism
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respond ‘as fast and as accurately as possible’. After the instructions, subjects completed 11
training trials with easy stimulus combinations to acclimate themselves with the task.
Due to concerns about participants’ potential distractibility in an online environment if the
task was too long, we reduced the number of trials to 130 (Section A2 in S1 Supplementary
Information). The trials appeared in a random order, with lake drawings being different for
every trial. Every 22 trials, the participants were prompted to take a break, which they could
end with the press of a button. Lakes had 9 possible ratios of red to black fish, while baskets
appeared in 9 possible sizes, both corresponding to the probabilities 0.1 to 0.9. In all trials, like-
lihoods and priors were complimentary (e.g., if the left fish proportions were 0.3, the right
would be 0.7). Therefore, probabilities mentioned in the text refer to the left lake, as the proba-
bilities for the right can be immediately inferred.
Model-free analysis
Linear mixed-effects models (LMEs) were used to verify that participants combined the infor-
mation of both baskets and fish ratios when making their decisions and to investigate any pos-
sible interactions with autistic traits. We chose the absolute confidence of the participants as
the response variable (|c– 0.5|, with c being the participant confidence estimate). We modelled
the following as fixed effects with repeated measures across the subjects in all LMEs: i) the
absolute likelihood (|likelihood– 0.5|); ii) the prior congruency, that is how much the prior
agreed with the likelihood (|prior– 0.5| � sgn[(prior– 0.5)(likelihood– 0.5)]); iii) the reaction
times, which were used to investigate the possibility of a speed-accuracy trade-off. All LMEs
also included the two-way interaction between i and ii, with the participants being treated as a
random factor. We analysed our results with 5 different LME variants. The first one, LME_-
core only used the aforementioned components. LME_AQ expanded upon LME_core by
including a fixed effect for AQ and the two- and three-way interactions of AQ with i and ii.
LME_PDI was the same as LME_AQ but with the PDI scores instead of the AQ. Then, LME_-
full, used both AQ and PDI and their interactions with i and ii, but no interactions between
them. Finally, LME_rtInteract expanded upon the LME_full to include interactions between
AQ or PDI and reaction times. Full specification of the models in Wilkinson notation can be
found in Section B1 of S1 Supplementary Information.
Bayesian models
Data were fitted with four Bayesian models: Simple Bayes (SB), Weighted Bayes (WB), and
two variants of the circular inference model: Circular Inference–Interference (CII) and Circu-
lar Inference–No Interference (CINI). Originally [23], the inferential processes expressed by
these models were simulated in a hierarchical network, where priors corresponded to top-
down signals and likelihoods to bottom-up ones. In the current study, we followed Jardri et al.
in fitting simplified models, that capture the network effects with significantly fewer free
parameters [27].
SB combines the two sources of information using Bayes’ theorem. This is expressed in
logits as
Lc ¼ Lp þ Ls; ð1Þ
with subscript p corresponding to trial prior, s to sensory evidence, and c to the confidence
estimate, while L denotes the respective logit.
WB expands upon SB:
Lc ¼ FðLp;wpÞ þ FðLs;wsÞ; ð2Þ
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY No increased circular inference in high autistic traits or autism
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where F is the sigmoid function
F L;wð Þ ¼ ln
weL þ 1   w
ð1   wÞeL þ w
� �
; ð3Þ
allowing for the underweighting of priors or likelihoods. Each weight w determines the influ-
ence of the corresponding signal to the confidence estimate. This depends on how the reliabil-
ity of that signal is estimated by each participant.
CII has the form:
Lc ¼ FðLp þ I;wpÞ þ FðLs þ I;wsÞ; ð4Þ
I ¼ FðapLp;wpÞ þ FðasLs;wsÞ; ð5Þ
where top-down and bottom-up signals get reverberated, interfering with one another, and
end up corrupting prior beliefs and sensory evidence by the same amount, I. Parameters ap
and as affect the number of times the respective information is overcounted, expressing the sig-
nals’ reverberation.
CINI is similar to CII, but it assumes that both signals get reverberated or overcounted sep-
arately and are only combined at the end of the process:
Lc ¼ FðLp þ FðapLp;wpÞ;wpÞ þ FðLs þ FðasLs;wsÞ;wsÞ: ð6Þ
SB has 0 free parameters, WB 2, and both CII and CINI have the same 4. True parameter
ranges were [0.5, 1] for the weights (w) and [0, 60] for the reverberation parameters (a); how-
ever, these were rescaled to [0, 1] so that they could be easily compared with those reported by
Jardri et al. 60 is an arbitrary upper limit, that however is high enough for our purposes, as no
parameter approached it (max non-rescaled CINI a = 29.02). In the rest of this article, we will
be referring exclusively to the rescaled parameters, however the word ‘rescaled’ will be omitted
for conciseness. A (rescaled) weight value of w = 0 shows no influence of the corresponding
signal, while both w = 1 make WB equivalent to SB and both a = 0 make CII and CINI equiva-
lent to WB. The difference between CII and CINI is subtle, but important. In CINI, the sensory
and prior signals are combined linearly, while in CII, one signal’s influence on the model esti-
mate depends on the strength of the other, due to the interference between them. Fig 2 illus-
trates the behavioural patterns predicted by the different models.
We followed Jardri et al., assuming Gaussian noise in the logit model estimates (Lc), and
therefore fitted models via least squares, which is equivalent to maximum likelihood estima-
tion in that case. Model comparison was performed using an approximation of the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) for normally distributed errors,
BIC ¼ n lnðs2Þ þ k lnðnÞ; ð7Þ
where n is the number of datapoints, k the number of free parameters, and σ the model’s mean
squared error. To choose a model across all subjects, we followed the random-effects Bayesian
model selection [44], implemented in the SPM12 [45]. Group-level BIC [46], a fixed-effects
approach, produced similar results.
Statistical analysis and validity of results
We investigated the hypothesis of an association between autism and circular inference (H₁) in
three ways: 1) correlations between model parameters and total AQ scores; 2) differences
between the low- and high-AQ groups, defined as participants in the top and bottom 15% of
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the sample (AQ� 30, n = 29, M/F: 13/14 vs AQ� 16, n = 30, M/F: 15/15); 3) differences
between subjects with an ASD diagnosis and those without, who also did not identify as part of
the autism spectrum (ASD, n = 21, M/F: 13/8 vs ND, n = 61, M/F: 39/22; answers 1, 2 vs 5 in
Section A1 in S1 Supplementary Information). The nonparametric measures of Kendall rank
correlation coefficient and Mann-Whitney U test were chosen, as model parameters were not
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test; p� 0.0068) and there is no reason to expect a linear
relationship between them and psychiatric traits. The common language effect size statistic (f)
was reported for the Mann-Whitney U [47]. All analyses were performed in MATLAB
R2020a.
To quantify the evidence for the null hypothesis (H₀) in favour of the alternative one (H₁),
we calculated the Bayes factors 01 (BF₀₁) for each of our tests. 1< BF₀₁� 3 constitutes weak
evidence in favour of H₀, 3< BF₀₁� 20 positive evidence, and BF₀₁> 20 strong [48]. Note
that BF₁₀ = 1/BF₀₁. Bayes factors were calculated in JASP 0.14, using the default priors [49]. To
verify the fitting and model selection processes, we performed parameter and model recovery
on CINI and CII using the current set with the 130 trials, as SB and WB scored very poorly in
model comparisons.
Both models showed moderate recovery for the reverberation parameters (CINI ap,
r = 0.54; as, r = 0.58; CII ap, r = 0.54; as, r = 0.71), although this was partly due to Pearson’s
Fig 2. Illustration of WB (A), CII (B), and CINI(C) behaviour. The graphs show how logit model confidence estimates change as a function of logit likelihood (fish
proportions). Different colours represent different prior values (basket size) and grey lines represent the SB model predictions. The SB model simply combines the
information of the two signals by adding their logits. WB can underweight either or both signals, while, in addition to that, the circular inference models allow for signal
overcounting. In CII, the contribution of the likelihood on the confidence estimate depends on the prior value and vice versa. In contrast with that, in the CINI model,
each source of information affects the confidence independently, and therefore the graph lines are completely parallel to each other. Parameter values were the same for all
models (ap = 0.02, as = 0.05, wp = 0.8, ws = 0.06).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.g002





Perfect model recovery would result in 1000 participants in the (CINI, CINI) and (CII, CII) cells, and 0 in the rest.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.t001
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correlation sensitivity to outliers [50] (for details see Section B3 in S1 Supplementary Informa-
tion). The models exhibited excellent recovery for the weight parameters (CINI wp, r = 0.96;
ws, r = 0.91; CII wp, r = 0.94; ws, r = 0.93). They also showed no correlation between different
parameters (Tables B3 and B4 in S1 Supplementary Information). Model recovery was good
for both models, with approximately 80% of the simulated participants being better fitted by
their generating model (Table 1).
Results
Model-free findings
Participant responses adapted to changes in both priors and likelihoods, showing that they
took both sources of information into account to make their confidence estimate (Fig 3).
Despite that, their behaviour was not strictly Bayesian. A change from 0.5 to 0.4 or 0.6 in either
prior or likelihood corresponded to a disproportionally large shift in the average response,
indicative of signal reverberation.
Among the linear mixed-effects models, the one which achieved the smallest BIC was
LME_core (ΔBIC: LME_PDI, 17; LME_AQ, 35; LME_full, 51; LME_rtInteract, 69). All models
confirmed the influence of both absolute likelihood (e.g., LME_core: t = 44.50, p< 10−323) and
prior congruency (e.g., LME_core: t = 24.63, p = 10−132), as well as the interaction of the two
components (e.g., LME_core: t = 25.20, p = 10−138). Despite the LME_core being the best
model, both LME_PDI and LME_full showed significant association between absolute confi-
dence and non-clinical delusional beliefs (PDI) (e.g., LME_PDI results: t = 2.08, p = 0.037) and
an interaction between absolute likelihood and PDI (e.g., LME_PDI results: t = 2.31,
p = 0.021). However, neither the influence of autistic traits (AQ) or its interactions with model
components were significant in the LME_AQ and LME_full models. Reaction times showed a
negative relationship with absolute confidence in all models (e.g., LME_core: t = –17.01,
p = 10−64), which is presumably a result of participants taking more time to respond when they
are uncertain [51]. Importantly though, the LME_rtInteract achieved the worst BIC score,
with no interaction between psychiatric traits and reaction times (LME_rtInteract: PDI
Fig 3. Average logit confidence estimates for all participants as a function of priors (A) and likelihoods (B). Logit
confidence estimates for the left lake increase following an increase in either prior probability for the left lake (baskets) or
likelihood (fish ratios), showing that participants incorporate both information sources in their decision-making.
However, their behaviour is far from strictly Bayesian, as evidenced by the differences between coloured and grey lines (SB
confidence estimates). Different colours correspond to different likelihood (probability) values in the left graph and
different prior (probability) values in the right.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.g003
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t = 1.29, p = 0.20; AQ t = 0.72, p = 0.47). This suggests that any possible relationship between
AQ or PDI and participant behaviour is not a result of differences in time management. The
full LME results can be found in Section B1 of S1 Supplementary Information.
Model-based findings
Both random- and fixed-effects model comparisons showed that Circular Inference–No Inter-
ference was the best fitting model, followed by Circular Inference–Interference (Fig 4). Since
model fit plots showed that both CINI and CII fit the data relatively well (Fig D1 in S1 Supple-
mentary Information), for the sake of completeness, we conducted the same analysis with
parameters from both models. Results from CINI are reported below, while those from CII
can be found in S1 Supplementary Information (Section D2).
There was no evidence of a relationship between prior or likelihood reverberation and total
AQ scores (Table 2). The only correlation that reached an (uncorrected) p-value of lower than
0.05 was a negative correlation between AQ and the CINI prior weight (τ = –0.12, p = 0.02,
BF₁₀ = 1.57), but this did not survive adjusting for multiple comparisons [52]. Furthermore,
the low- and the high-AQ groups behaved in a similar way (Fig 5), and the comparison
between the parameters of high- and low-AQ groups did not reveal any difference, neither did
the comparison between the ASD participants and those with no diagnosis (ND) (Fig 6 and
Table 3). Since it is possible that ND subjects with high autistic traits have an undiagnosed
autism spectrum disorder, we performed an additional comparison between the ASD group
and the subgroup of ND participants with weak autistic traits (AQ� 17, n = 21, M/F: 13/8).
No difference between these groups was found (Section D1 in S1 Supplementary Information).
A weak positive correlation was found between PDI and the likelihood weight (τ = 0.13,
p = 0.02, BF₁₀ = 2.08; Table 2), that again is not significant when corrected. No relationship
was present between psychiatric traits or diagnoses and CII parameters (Section D2 in S1 Sup-
plementary Information).
Fig 4. Results of fixed (A) and random (B) model comparisons. (A) Group-level ΔBIC is defined as the sum of
individual participant BIC scores for each model minus the sum for CII, used as a baseline, as it was the winning model
in the Jardri et al. study [27]. The lower the BIC the better the model, with differences of more than 20 between BIC scores
considered very strong evidence [48]. ΔBIC for CII is by definition 0. (B) Posterior model probabilities calculated using
Bayesian model selection [44]. Both measures clearly show that Circular Inference models better account for the data,
with CINI being a slightly better fit than CII.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.g004
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Discussion
In the present study, we investigated the relationship between circular inference and autistic
traits or autism. Circular inference is an impairment in Bayesian hierarchical networks where
top-down or bottom-up signals get reverberated throughout the network, becoming signifi-
cantly amplified [23]. We hypothesised that stronger autistic traits and ASD diagnoses would
be associated with stronger reverberation of priors or sensory evidence. We used the fisher
task, a probabilistic decision-making task that had been used previously with patients with
schizophrenia [27]. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore signal reverberation in
ASD. Our analysis showed that the circular inference models perform best across the whole
sample, similarly to previous results [27,29]. However, our hypothesis was refuted. Specifically,
no correlation was found between autistic traits and either reverberation parameter. Similarly,
there were no differences in these parameters between the groups with the strongest and weak-
est autistic traits, and no differences between the autistic subjects and those with no self-
reported diagnosis.
Circular inference attempts to model the effects of increased excitation-to-inhibition ratio,
a phenomenon which has been strongly associated with schizophrenia [24,25]. Indeed, Jardri
et al. found clear experimental evidence for stronger likelihood reverberation in SCZ patients,
using the fisher task [27]. On that account, the absence of any difference between our partici-
pant groups is surprising, given the observed inhibitory impairments in ASD [33,34] and the
commonalities between autism and schizophrenia regarding E/I imbalances [53,54]. More-
over, prominent computational explanations for the two conditions suggest similar Bayesian
impairments between them. Specifically, it has been proposed that an imbalance of likelihoods
to priors, in favour of the former, lies at the heart of both ASD and SCZ [12–16]. This seems to
be contradicted by our findings, which showed no increase in reverberation along the autism
spectrum, despite the presence of such an increase in schizophrenia. This is further exhibited
in a qualitative comparison between the conditions, which showed higher likelihood reverber-
ation in SCZ (Fig E1 in S1 Supplementary Information). A divergence in the Bayesian mecha-
nisms of the two conditions has also been observed by Karvelis et al., which showed an
association between autistic traits and increased sensory precision, but no discernible imbal-
ance in schizotypy, in a statistical learning task [55]. A partial divergence was also found by
Noel et al., in an audio-visual synchrony task, where patients with schizophrenia showed
increased unreliability in sensory representations, in addition to differences in their priors,
which they shared with the autistic participants [56]. No other studies are known to us that
compare ASD and SCZ using the same tasks and Bayesian models, despite the commonalities
between their computational explanations (for reviews see [14,15]).
Table 2. Kendall rank correlations between CINI parameters and psychiatric traits.
AQ PDI
CINI params τ p BF₀₁ Τ p BF₀₁
ap 0.04 0.5 7.98 –0.04 0.48 7.76
as –0.02 0.65 9.11 0.01 0.85 9.94
wp –0.12 0.02 0.64 0.07 0.20 4.14
ws –0.02 0.69 9.35 0.13 0.02 0.48
Total AQ scores and Y/N PDI scores were used for the correlations. τ signifies the correlation coefficient. p-values
are not adjusted for multiple comparisons. BF₀₁ stands for the Bayes factor 01, with higher values corresponding to
stronger evidence for the null hypothesis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.t002
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY No increased circular inference in high autistic traits or autism
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006 September 24, 2021 10 / 17
In agreement with the findings of Jardri et al. [27], we found compelling evidence for signal
reverberation across our sample. Interestingly though, one variant of the model, Circular
Inference–No Interference (CINI), was a better fit for our data compared to the other variant,
Circular Inference–Interference (CII), contrary to the Jardri et al. study. Additional analysis of
the Jardri et al. dataset revealed that this is partially because we used fewer trials than in the
original study (Table E3 in S1 Supplementary Information). Furthermore, even in the original
dataset, CII was dominant mostly in the SCZ subsample, while it performed equally well with
CINI in controls. The dominance of CINI across our sample (Table E3 in S1 Supplementary
Information) is an indication that prior beliefs and sensory evidence are reverberated, even in
healthy participants. While we can only speculate about the possible neurobiological underpin-
nings of our circular inference models, we proposed that reverberation arises due to an
increased E/I ratio, based on the network model of Jardri & Denève [23]. If that is the case,
CINI might correspond to a weak or localised E/I imbalance, affecting the signals only
Fig 5. Participant confidence estimates and CINI model fits for the low-AQ (A) and the high-AQ (B) groups.
Model and participant logit confidence as function of logit likelihoods and priors. Coloured lines represent model
predictions and rhombuses the participant confidence estimates. Different colours represent logit likelihood in A and logit
prior values in B and are equivalent to probabilities of 0.5 to 0.9. Since both the task and the CINI model structure are
symmetrical around 0 logit confidence (0.5 probability), participant estimates have been averaged between symmetric
trials to reduce noise (e.g., a trial with a logit prior of –1 and a logit likelihood of 2 is symmetrical to one with a logit prior
of 1 and a logit likelihood of –2).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.g005
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separately. In schizophrenia, then, this imbalance would be larger and extend across the cogni-
tive hierarchy, which would lead to interference between priors and likelihoods, making CII
the better fit for these participants.
Surprisingly, we found no evidence for an association between prior or likelihood weights
and ASD diagnoses or AQ scores. This result is seemingly in contrast with previous studies
showing an overweighting of likelihoods relative to priors in autistic individuals or those with
stronger autistic traits (e.g., [55,57–59]). However, these effects have been demonstrated exclu-
sively in perceptual tasks, with the rare study of Bayesian decision-making in ASD showing no
such imbalance [60,61]. Another important difference is that in most of the literature, partici-
pants have to learn prior beliefs based on the observed statistics, while in our study they are
explicitly presented by the size of the baskets. It is possible that the cause of the prior-likelihood
imbalance found in the literature lies in impaired prior acquisition, rather than in the relative
weighting of the prior per se.
Our analysis revealed a slight increase of absolute confidence with stronger non-clinical
delusional beliefs (PDI), but no association between PDI and any reverberation parameter.
Fig 6. CINI parameter values of ND vs ASD groups (Α) and low-AQ vs high-AQ groups (Β). Violin plots show the
density of estimated parameters over the possible values, relative to the subgroup size. Dashed lines in the middle
represent the median, while dotted ones represent the top and bottom quartiles in each group. No differences are observed
between groups.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.g006
Table 3. Mann-Whitney U test results between the CINI parameters of the ASD and ND groups and the low-AQ
and high-AQ groups.
ND vs ASD low-AQ vs high-AQ
CINI params f p BF₀₁ F p BF₀₁
ap 0.55 0.50 3.82 0.54 0.63 3.60
as 0.45 0.46 3.15 0.47 0.70 3.88
wp 0.47 0.64 3.85 0.40 0.19 1.96
ws 0.53 0.71 3.71 0.42 0.31 2.17
Total AQ scores were used for the comparisons. f signifies the common language effect size, with larger f values
corresponding to larger parameter values for the ASD and the high-AQ groups. An f of 0.5 corresponds to no
differences. p-values are not adjusted for multiple comparisons. BF₀₁ stands for the Bayes factor 01, with higher
values corresponding to stronger evidence for the null hypothesis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006.t003
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This confirms the Jardri et al. findings of no such relationship in healthy subjects, although
only 8 participants had scores above the clinical PDI mean of 11.9 [42]. This result would
deserve further investigation with a more thorough assessment of schizotypy, so as to assess
how it can fit with the dimensional view of schizophrenia [62]. Interestingly, PDI scores
showed a significant interaction with likelihoods in the linear mixed-effects models and a
slight correlation with the likelihood weights. While the latter result was not significant when
adjusted for multiple comparisons, both of them agree with the prominent theory of over-
weighted likelihoods in schizophrenia (e.g., [16]).
Limitations and future work
Through our recruitment methods, we had aimed to recruit participants with a broad range of
autistic traits. However, the resulting variance of AQ in our sample (SD 6.5) was only marginally
higher than what is found in the general population (SD 5.6, [43]). Moreover, only 4 participants
had an AQ score of more than 1 SD below the neurotypical mean of 16.9 [43] and only 5 partici-
pants had an AQ above the clinical mean of 35.2 [43]. A wider range of autistic traits would be
useful in investigating Bayesian impairments that might be associated with the extremes of the
AQ distribution. Moreover, the diagnoses of our participants in the Prolific subsample were self-
reported. What those diagnoses were based on, and when they were delivered is uncertain, which
could explain the atypical AQ scores of the ASD group. Our findings will need to be confirmed
in a sample verified by a mental health professional, especially as the criteria for an ASD diagnosis
have largely changed between versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders [63]. Such a study would also benefit from cognitive measures, to ensure that perceptual or
verbal reasoning abilities do not constitute a confounder for any differences between the groups.
Another limitation that also nuances the comparison with previous investigations in schizophre-
nia [27] concerns the fact that our experiment took place online. The lack of a lab-controlled
environment could have substantially affected the quality of the collected data. Adding to that is
the absence of in-person communication between participants and researchers, so the instruc-
tions of the task could have been clearly conveyed and possible questions answered. Such effects
were visible in our dataset by the large portion of subjects that were excluded (�14%).
In the fisher task, the baskets are presented before the lakes. This means that participants
might simply display a recency bias, where the most recent evidence is overweighted. Under
the Bayesian framework, the earlier evidence should create a prior belief in the participants,
which is then combined with and updated by following evidence. Therefore, a recency bias is
indistinguishable from an overweighting of sensory evidence. A possible issue, though, is that
behavioural differences might be related to differences in the working memory of the partici-
pants. This could be especially important, since working memory is impaired in both ASD and
schizophrenia [64,65]. However, Jardri et al. measured working memory performance in their
sample and showed that it is correlated only with the prior weights, but not with the reverbera-
tion parameters. This would need to be validated in further studies, but we therefore expect
that our findings regarding circular inference in autism should be robust to potential differ-
ences in working memory.
As with other findings relating behaviour to Bayesian inference impairments, it will be
important to assess how our findings can be generalised to other tasks or modalities. Circular
inference is formalised within a hierarchical Bayesian framework of cognitive processing. This
framework assumes that priors express the (top-down) influences of the more abstract repre-
sentations of the environment to the less abstract ones, while likelihoods encode the reverse
(bottom-up) influences [66]. It is difficult to verify that the information presented in the cur-
rent task (baskets and fish proportions) is encoded by subjects in the expected way–that is, that
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the preferences of the fisherman correspond to more abstract or contextual information and
the fish proportions to more sensory. If these stimuli were processed by the participants as
being in the same conceptual level, the task structure would be more akin to a delayed cue inte-
gration task [67]. Additionally, it is possible that the basket size is treated by some participants
as a qualitative variable, leading them to disregard the exact difference in size, something that
would appear as prior overcounting in the models (although see Section D4 in S1 Supplemen-
tary Information). We believe that these concerns do not invalidate our results, but further
research would be needed to understand how delayed cue integration tasks or qualitative
information fit within the circular inference framework.
Future research should replicate both ASD and SCZ findings in other tasks, involving dif-
ferent cognitive modalities. The social beads task of Simonsen et al. [29], for example, might be
well suited for the investigation of signal reverberation in ASD, given the condition’s impair-
ments. Perceptual tasks, on the other hand, would avoid conscious strategies that are especially
prevalent in decision-making, focusing instead on more fundamental computations in the
brain and connecting circular inference with the rest of the Bayesian literature. Equally impor-
tant is clarifying the connection between reverberation and neurophysiological measures, with
a focus on the spatial patterns of E/I imbalances across brain areas. Differences in such pat-
terns could explain why computational [14,15] and neurobiological [4,9] theories of ASD and
SCZ partially overlap, while their phenotypic expressions differ [53].
Supporting information
S1 Supplementary Information. Additional analyses and visualisations. Table B3 in S1 Sup-
plementary Information. Kendall rank correlations between recovered CINI parameters.
Table B4 in S1 Supplementary Information. Kendall rank correlations between recovered CII
parameters. Fig D1 in S1 Supplementary Information. CINI (top) and CII (bottom) model fit
vs participant logit confidence estimates. Fig E1 in S1 Supplementary Information. Reverbera-
tion parameters of the current study’s ASD sample and Jardri et al.’s SCZ sample. Table E3 in
S1 Supplementary Information. Fixed and random effects model comparisons in both studies.
(PDF)
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Nikitas Angeletos Chrysaitis, Renaud Jardri, Sophie Denève, Peggy Seriès.
Formal analysis: Nikitas Angeletos Chrysaitis, Peggy Seriès.
Methodology: Nikitas Angeletos Chrysaitis, Renaud Jardri, Sophie Denève, Peggy Seriès.
Project administration: Peggy Seriès.
Software: Nikitas Angeletos Chrysaitis, Renaud Jardri, Sophie Denève.
Supervision: Renaud Jardri, Sophie Denève, Peggy Seriès.
Visualization: Nikitas Angeletos Chrysaitis.
Writing – original draft: Nikitas Angeletos Chrysaitis.
Writing – review & editing: Renaud Jardri, Sophie Denève, Peggy Seriès.
References
1. Joyce EM, Roiser JP. Cognitive heterogeneity in schizophrenia: Curr Opin Psychiatry. 2007 May; 20
(3):268–72. https://doi.org/10.1097/YCO.0b013e3280ba4975 PMID: 17415081
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY No increased circular inference in high autistic traits or autism
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006 September 24, 2021 14 / 17
2. Masi A, DeMayo MM, Glozier N, Guastella AJ. An Overview of Autism Spectrum Disorder, Heterogene-
ity and Treatment Options. Neurosci Bull. 2017 Apr; 33(2):183–93. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12264-017-
0100-y PMID: 28213805
3. Kuhn R, Cahn CH. Eugen Bleuler’s Concepts of Psychopathology. Hist Psychiatry. 2004 Sep; 15
(3):361–6. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957154X04044603 PMID: 15386868
4. Couture SM, Penn DL, Losh M, Adolphs R, Hurley R, Piven J. Comparison of social cognitive function-
ing in schizophrenia and high functioning autism: more convergence than divergence. Psychol Med.
2010 Apr; 40(4):569–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329170999078X PMID: 19671209
5. Pinkham AE, Hopfinger JB, Pelphrey KA, Piven J, Penn DL. Neural bases for impaired social cognition
in schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders. Schizophr Res. 2008 Feb; 99(1–3):164–75. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2007.10.024 PMID: 18053686
6. Patterson PH. Immune involvement in schizophrenia and autism: Etiology, pathology and animal mod-
els. Behav Brain Res. 2009;9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2008.07.025 PMID: 18706934
7. Cade R, Privette M, Fregly M, Rowland N, Sun Z, Zele V, et al. Autism and Schizophrenia: Intestinal
Disorders. Nutr Neurosci. 2000 Jan; 3(1):57–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/1028415X.2000.11747303
PMID: 27416160
8. Carroll LS, Owen MJ. Genetic overlap between autism, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Genome
Med. 2009; 1(10):102. https://doi.org/10.1186/gm102 PMID: 19886976
9. King BH, Lord C. Is schizophrenia on the autism spectrum? Brain Res. 2011 Mar; 1380:34–41. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2010.11.031 PMID: 21078305
10. Rapoport J, Chavez A, Greenstein D, Addington A, Gogtay N. Autism Spectrum Disorders and Child-
hood-Onset Schizophrenia: Clinical and Biological Contributions to a Relation Revisited. J Am Acad
Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2009 Jan; 48(1):10–8. https://doi.org/10.1097/CHI.0b013e31818b1c63
PMID: 19218893
11. Knill DC, Pouget A. The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation.
Trends Neurosci. 2004 Dec; 27(12):712–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 PMID: 15541511
12. Pellicano E, Burr D. When the world becomes ‘too real’: a Bayesian explanation of autistic perception.
Trends Cogn Sci. 2012 Oct; 16(10):504–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.009 PMID:
22959875
13. Lawson RP, Rees G, Friston KJ. An aberrant precision account of autism. Front Hum Neurosci [Inter-
net]. 2014 May 14 [cited 2020 Nov 27];8. Available from: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/
fnhum.2014.00302/abstract PMID: 24860482
14. Valton V, Romaniuk L, Douglas Steele J, Lawrie S, Seriès P. Comprehensive review: Computational
modelling of schizophrenia. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 2017 Dec; 83:631–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
neubiorev.2017.08.022 PMID: 28867653
15. Palmer CJ, Lawson RP, Hohwy J. Bayesian approaches to autism: Towards volatility, action, and
behavior. Psychol Bull. 2017; 143(5):521–42. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000097 PMID: 28333493
16. Sterzer P, Adams RA, Fletcher P, Frith C, Lawrie SM, Muckli L, et al. The Predictive Coding Account of
Psychosis. Biol Psychiatry. 2018 Nov; 84(9):634–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2018.05.015
PMID: 30007575
17. Chambon V, Pacherie E, Barbalat G, Jacquet P, Franck N, Farrer C. Mentalizing under influence:
abnormal dependence on prior expectations in patients with schizophrenia. Brain. 2011 Dec; 134
(12):3728–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awr306 PMID: 22108577
18. Powers AR, Mathys C, Corlett PR. Pavlovian conditioning–induced hallucinations result from over-
weighting of perceptual priors. Science. 2017 Aug 11; 357(6351):596–600. https://doi.org/10.1126/
science.aan3458 PMID: 28798131
19. Cassidy CM, Balsam PD, Weinstein JJ, Rosengard RJ, Slifstein M, Daw ND, et al. A Perceptual Infer-
ence Mechanism for Hallucinations Linked to Striatal Dopamine. Curr Biol. 2018 Feb; 28(4):503–514.
e4. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2017.12.059 PMID: 29398218
20. Speechley W. The contribution of hypersalience to the “jumping to conclusions” bias associated with
delusions in schizophrenia. J Psychiatry Neurosci. 2010 Jan 1; 35(1):7–17. https://doi.org/10.1503/jpn.
090025 PMID: 20040242
21. King DJ, Hodgekins J, Chouinard PA, Chouinard V-A, Sperandio I. A review of abnormalities in the per-
ception of visual illusions in schizophrenia. Psychon Bull Rev. 2017 Jun; 24(3):734–51. https://doi.org/
10.3758/s13423-016-1168-5 PMID: 27730532
22. Fletcher PC, Frith CD. Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symp-
toms of schizophrenia. Nat Rev Neurosci. 2009 Jan; 10(1):48–58. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2536
PMID: 19050712
23. Jardri R, Denève S. Circular inferences in schizophrenia. Brain. 2013 Nov; 136(11):3227–41.
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY No increased circular inference in high autistic traits or autism
PLOS Computational Biology | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009006 September 24, 2021 15 / 17
24. O’Donnell P. Adolescent Onset of Cortical Disinhibition in Schizophrenia: Insights From Animal Models.
Schizophr Bull. 2011 May 1; 37(3):484–92. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbr028 PMID: 21505115
25. Grent-’t-Jong T, Gross J, Goense J, Wibral M, Gajwani R, Gumley AI, et al. Resting-state gamma-band
power alterations in schizophrenia reveal E/I-balance abnormalities across illness-stages. eLife. 2018
Sep 27; 7:e37799. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.37799 PMID: 30260771
26. Evans S, Averbeck B, Furl N. Jumping to conclusions in schizophrenia. Neuropsychiatr Dis Treat. 2015
Jul;1615. https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S56870 PMID: 26170674
27. Jardri R, Duverne S, Litvinova AS, Denève S. Experimental evidence for circular inference in schizo-
phrenia. Nat Commun. 2017 Apr; 8(1):14218.
28. Ross RM, McKay R, Coltheart M, Langdon R. Jumping to Conclusions About the Beads Task? A Meta-
analysis of Delusional Ideation and Data-Gathering. Schizophr Bull. 2015 Sep; 41(5):1183–91. https://
doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbu187 PMID: 25616503
29. Simonsen A, Fusaroli R, Petersen ML, Vermillet A-Q, Bliksted V, Mors O, et al. Taking others into
account: combining directly experienced and indirect information in schizophrenia. Brain [Internet].
2021 Apr 8 [cited 2021 Apr 12]; Available from: https://academic.oup.com/brain/advance-article/doi/10.
1093/brain/awab065/6214913
30. Casanova MF, Buxhoeveden DP, Switala AE, Roy E. Minicolumnar pathology in autism. Neurology.
2002 Feb 12; 58(3):428–32. https://doi.org/10.1212/wnl.58.3.428 PMID: 11839843
31. Rubenstein JLR, Merzenich MM. Model of autism: increased ratio of excitation/inhibition in key neural
systems. Genes Brain Behav. 2003 Oct; 2(5):255–67. https://doi.org/10.1034/j.1601-183x.2003.00037.
x PMID: 14606691
32. Brown C, Gruber T, Boucher J, Rippon G, Brock J. Gamma Abnormalities During Perception of Illusory
Figures in Autism. Cortex. 2005 Jan; 41(3):364–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-9452(08)70273-9
PMID: 15871601
33. Kana RK, Keller TA, Minshew NJ, Just MA. Inhibitory Control in High-Functioning Autism: Decreased
Activation and Underconnectivity in Inhibition Networks. Biol Psychiatry. 2007 Aug; 62(3):198–206.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2006.08.004 PMID: 17137558
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